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Abstract
There are five ways in which shame might negatively impact upon our attempts to combat and
treat HIV.
1. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history
to the clinician.
2. Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being
retained in care.
3. Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.
4. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to new sexual partners.
5. Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far
more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be.
Drawing on recent philosophical work on shame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and
psychology of emotion, we (a.) propose a framework for understanding how shame operates upon
those who experience the emotion, (b.) propose a strategy for combatting the negative role shame
plays in the fight against HIV, and (c) suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might
be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In this article we propose five ways in which shame plays a negative practi-
cal role in public health and in the clinical diagnosis and treatment of HIV.
We progress to suggest that a better understanding of shame will enable
the development of strategies, which might help people living with HIV to
overcome shame and help clinicians to mitigate the effects of shame. We
propose that this will contribute significantly to enhancing diagnosis, mili-
tating against new infections and improving early diagnosis rates.
There are five ways in which shame negatively impacts on
attempts to combat and treat HIV, which emerge from the stigma HIV
carries and STI-stigma in general.
1. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant
facts about their sexual history to the clinician.
2. Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not
engaging with or being retained in care.
3. Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI
and HIV testing.
4. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI)
status to new sexual partners.
5. Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the
task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it
should, or needs to, be.
Shame, therefore, has consequences, both in the clinical setting and
for public health. In what follows, we shall discuss the first four items
in our list. We shall then provide a framework for understanding the
way shame operates and propose strategies for helping people
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overcome their shame. We conclude the article by proposing further
study.
In outlining a number of ways in which shame might operate as a
barrier to good care, effective treatment and public health policy, we
shall emphasise the importance of understanding the nature of shame.
Such an understanding is of central importance if we are to find effec-
tive ways of banishing or mitigating the emotion for the purposes of
good clinical and public health practice. For the impact of shame should
concern us all. HIV poses a challenge to society as a whole: people liv-
ing with HIV should not feel ashamed and stigmatised and we should
not be facing new infections which might have been avoided in the
absence of HIV-stigma and shame.
While stigma has been extensively discussed in the context of
HIV,1 the relationship between HIV-stigma and shame, and how the
latter poses serious problems for us, is much less widely discussed.
Take, for example, the widely-read and influential 2003 paper on
HIV stigma by Parker and Aggleton2 from the journal Social Science
and Medicine; in this paper, the authors make some important points
about conceptual clarity in addressing the problem of stigma, but
they do so without discussing shame, as the emotional response to
stigma. We would argue that this is akin to proposing strategies and
methods for studying the social phenomenon of “threats” while not
undertaking, nor even talking about, the fear response to threats.
Just as threats are of interest to us as social phenomena because of
the impact they have on our lives through the responses they
engender, so stigma is of interest to us because of the responses it
engenders, the way it makes us feel and behave.3 We therefore
need to understand those emotional responses, how they are oper-
ative, under what conditions and so on.
Moreover, while shame has not gone completely without discus-
sion in the context of HIV, and sexual health more broadly, much of
the discussion is undertaken without going below the philosophical
‘waterline’, as it were. Again, Parker and Aggelton’s4 discussion of
stigma is a case in point; for while the task they set themselves is
one of arguing for a better conceptual understanding of stigma in
HIV research, in undertaking this task they stop short of engaging in
the sort of philosophical work in the epistemology and ontology of
stigma that is, we suggest, required for better understanding. Instead,
they proceed to select from among a number of social theories, their
favourite being a reworking of Goffman, to incorporate insights from
Foucault and Bourdieu. The point we want to emphasise is this: it is
crucial to be well-versed in the philosophical discussions about human
emotions, and shame, and have these discussions inform one’s prac-
tice, if that practice is to be effective. Misidentifying the nature of
shame and stigma will lead to ‘misfiring’ attempts to address shame
and stigma.
One of the central claims for which we are arguing here is that
theories of shame and stigma are not what is required (either philo-
sophical theories or social theories). As we will argue below, shame is a
response to the meaningful lifeworld, and the meaning the lifeworld
has for an individual draws on the individual’s enculturation, their inter-
ests, and the socio-political context. Because shame draws on resour-
ces that exist at high levels of cultural specificity, there are likely to be
significant differences in the specifics of shame and stigma across cul-
tures, socio-political contexts and relative to the specific individual
involved. We therefore want here, in this article, to argue for a frame-
work which affords us a sensitivity to such cultural, socio-political and
individual specifics that comprise actual shame and stigma experiences
in specific contexts.
1See, for example: Altman, D., Aggleton P., Williams M., Kong T., Reddy
V., Harrad D., . . . Parker R. (2012). Men who have sex with men: Stigma
and discrimination. The Lancet, 380(9839), 439–445; Anderson, M., Elam,
G., Gerver, S., Solarin, I., Fenton, K., & Easterbrook, P. (2008). HIV/AIDS-
related stigma and discrimination: Accounts of HIV-positive Caribbean
people in the United Kingdom. Social Science & Medicine, 67(5), 790–8;
Berger, M. T. (2004). Workable sisterhood: The political journey of stigma-
tized women with HIV/AIDS. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press; Bernays, S., Rhodes, T., & Janković-Terzić, K. (2010). You should be
grateful to have medicines: Continued dependence, altering stigma and
the HIV treatment experience in Serbia. AIDS Care, 22(suppl. 1), 14–20;
Bharat, S., (2011). A systematic review of HIV/AIDS-related stigma and
discrimination in India: Current understanding and future needs. SAHARA
J, Journal of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS Research Alliance, 8(3), 38–48;
Bravo, P., Edwards, A., Rollnick, S., & Elwyn, G. (2010). Tough decisions
faced by people living with HIV: A literature review of psychosocial prob-
lems. AIDS Reviews, 12, 76–88; Campbell, C., & Deacon, H. (2006). Unrav-
elling the contexts of stigma: From internalisation to resistance to change.
Journal of community & applied social psychology, 16, 411–417; Campbell,
C., Foulis, C. A., Maimane, S., & Sibiya, Z. (2005). I have an evil child at
my house: Stigma and the HIV/AIDS management in a South African
community. American Journal of Public Health, 95(5), 808–815; Campbell,
C., Nair, Y., Maimane, S., & Nicholson, J. (2007). Dying twice: A multi-
level model of the roots of AIDS stigma in two South African commun-
ities. Journal of Health Psychology, 12(3), 403–416; Castro, A., & Farmer,
P. (2005). Understanding and addressing AIDS-related stigma: From
anthropological theory to clinical practice in Haiti. American Journal of
Public Health, 95(1), 53–59; Collins, P. Y., von Unger, H., & Armbrister, A.
(2008). Church ladies, good girls, and locas: Stigma and the intersection of
gender, ethnicity, mental illness, and sexuality in relation to HIV risk.
Social Science and Medicine, 67, 389–397; Dodds, C. (2006). HIV-related
stigma in England: Experiences of gay men and heterosexual African
migrants living with HIV. Journal of community & applied social psychology,
16, 472–480; Green, G. (1995). Attitudes towards people w HIV: Are
they as stigmatising as people with HIV perceive them to be? Social Sci-
ence & Medicine, 41(4), 557–568; Haile, R., Padilla, M. B., & Parker, E. A.
(2011). Stuck in the quagmire of an HIV ghetto: The meaning of stigma in
the lives of older black gay and bisexual men living with HIV in New
York City. Culture, health & sexuality, 13(4), 429–442; Kalichman, S. C.,
Simbayi, L. C., Cloete, A., Mthembu, P. P., Mkhonta, R. N., & Ginindza, T.
(2009). Measuring AIDS stigmas in people living with HIV/AIDS: The
internalized AIDS-related stigma scale. AIDS Care, 21(1), 87–93; Parker, R.,
& Aggleton, P. (2002). HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination: A con-
ceptual framework and an agenda for action. The Population Council Inc.
2Parker, R., & Aggleton, P. (2003). HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrim-
ination: A conceptual framework and implications for action. Social Science
& Medicine, 57, 13–24.
3Investigations which are concerned to focus upon how phenomena such
as threats and stigma can be used as tools of social control are also predi-
cated on understanding these phenomena as objects of fear and shame,
respectively.
4Parker, R., & Aggleton, op. cit. note 1.
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The bio-chemical5 advances in the treatment of HIV rank alongside
the foremost achievements of modern biomedicine, and perhaps even
beyond. In contrast, while the psycho-social aspects of HIV are widely
acknowledged as being constitutive of the distinctive pathology of the
virus, the extent to which we have understood the nature of, and
developed effective treatments for, HIV stigma and shame are marked
by a distinct lack of progress. We hope that this article will go some
way to reducing the inbalance between bio-chemical progress and
psycho-social inertia.
2 | UNDERSTANDING SHAME
When shame is discussed in the philosophical and psychological liter-
ature, it is usually depicted as a (higher) cognitive or complex emo-
tion of self-assessment.6 While there are some problems inherent to
this depiction, it serves as an appropriate starting point. When one
unpacks this categorisation, it means simply that the experience of
shame, its felt quality, or what we might call its phenomenology, is
characteristically constituted and type-individuated by evaluative
beliefs about the self (or a situation of which the self is a constituent
part). Where guilt is primarily associated with a belief that one has
acted in a transgressive manner, violating a law or social norm,
shame, it is often proposed, operates on one’s being: it is less about
what one does and more about who one is, and how this might
stand in relation to a person’s awareness of how others perceive
them. In addition, shame often leads to a desire to hide, to withdraw,
from the (life-)world.
Although this will stand as a preliminary depiction, it is important
not to be misled. One of us, Hutchinson,7 has proposed that the evalu-
ation which gives rise to shame operates not at the level of
propositionally-structured evaluative beliefs or judgements, but rather
at the level of conceptual frames.8 It will become clear why this is sig-
nificant as we progress.
2.1 | Autonomy and heteronomy
To feel shame is to regard oneself as worthy of shame, and this shame-
worthiness can have a number of sources. It can be heteronomous, so
that shame is an acknowledgement, a taking-on-board, of the judge-
ments (or morally-loaded perceptions) of others about one’s self, and in
so doing considering oneself, one’s being, to be in some way evalua-
tively diminished. Shame can also be autonomous, so that shame serves
as testament to a mismatch between the sense of self one assumes
and seeks to project to others and the self that one considers oneself
to be on reflection.
Autonomous shame, therefore, might emerge from a mismatch
prompted by acknowledging all one’s actions and all one’s beliefs,
rather than focusing only on some convenient or perhaps self-serving
selection of these. Take an example: consider the “liberal” who must
acknowledge their sexism or racism when they have reflected on their
subtle-but-there-all-the-same propensity to racial or gender stereotype.
In this case, shame might emerge as our “liberal” comes to acknowl-
edge the tension between this aspect of their character – their propen-
sity to subtle gender- or racial stereotyping – and the liberal character
they had assumed and projected as theirs. Shame, the emotion, can
testify to this (if they are merely embarrassed they really haven’t
acknowledged the true significance of the tension). This provides us
with an example of autonomous shame.
However, as we have already remarked, it is a characteristic of
the emotion that one can experience shame owing to tensions that
testify to mismatches between social norms or mores on the one
hand and aspects of one’s character on the other. Here the self-
evaluation that one falls short of some standard relates to a standard
which transcends and exists external to the character of the specific
individual. This is the kind of shame which testifies to perverse social
norms and mores, the sort of shame in evidence when one considers
the shame that some rape victims experience. Here the tension has
its source in the way in which social norms intersect with one’s
sense of self and how this, despite one’s beliefs about oneself, seems
to impose upon one a sense of shame. This type of shame is often
accompanied by a desire to flee or hide from others, from the soci-
ety (the audience, the honour group) that has conferred upon one
this shame. This provides us with an example of heteronomous
shame.
While there has been much discussion of whether shame is a char-
acteristically heteronomous or autonomous emotion,9 Hutchinson10
has argued that it can appear to operate, from case to case, either
autonomously or heteronomously, but that ultimately, when one looks
5We use “bio-chemical” to denote, specifically, drug interventions. We pre-
fer this to the term “bio-medical” in this context, because this latter term
both should and in fact does incorporate much of the psycho-social consid-
erations we are concerned with here. A clinician’s identification of appropri-
ate treatment of, for example, viral infection is based not only on
knowledge of the best bio-chemical intervention, which is read-off the cur-
rent RCT data (or meta-analyses), but also on judgements about the patient,
which involve judgements about their ability to adhere to drug regimens,
and so on. Therefore, it strikes us as misleading to contrast the bio-medical
with the psycho-social. Bio-medicine is, we believe, best understood as a
practice which incorporates bio-chemical expertise with biological (physio-
logical) knowledge, embedded in a background understanding of the ways
in which psycho-social factors penetrate and influence health. We want to
bring the background to the fore.
6Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, shame and guilt: Emotions of self-assessment.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Griffiths, P. E. (1998). What emotions really
are: The problem of psychological categories. Chicago: Chicago University
Press; Hutchinson, P. (2009). Emotion-philosophy-science. In Y. Gustafsson,
C. Kronkvist & M. McEachrane (Eds.) Understanding Emotions, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan; Hutchinson, P. (2008). Shame and philosophy: An inves-
tigation in the philosophy of emotions and ethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan.
7Hutchinson, op. cit. note 6; Hutchinson, P. (2015). Shame, placebo and
world-taking cognitivism. In S. George & P. Jung (Eds.) The Cultural Ontology
of the Self in Pain (p. 165–181). Springer.
8In addition to Hutchinson, op. cit. note 6, see also Kovecses, Z. (2000).
Metaphor and emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9Williams, B. (1994). Shame and necessity. Berkley: University of California
Press; Dilman, I. (1998). Shame, guilt and remorse. Philosophical Investiga-
tions. 22(4), 312–329.
10Hutchinson, op. cit. note 6.
HUTCHINSON AND DHAIRYAWAN
bs_bs_banner | 3
closely enough at the sources of shame, the distinction collapses. This
is an important point on which to be clear, because if one holds that
shame is always autonomous, that might well lead one to focus any
attempt to alleviate shame solely on the psychology of the individuals
who bear shame. One will see shame as a purely psychological problem
for individuals. Conversely, if one were to assume that shame is always
heteronomous, that shame is instantiated in individuals by their accep-
tance of the judgement of others who form their honour group, then
that will lead one to identify that which is in need of change as being
the social norms which the honour group (the shame-instantiating audi-
ence) embody (and/or the attachment the individual experiencing
shame has to those social norms). In this latter, heteronomous sense,
therefore, addressing shame might be a political, cultural and social
task in addition to being a psychological task.
To provide an example, the rape victim who feels shame for the
tainting of the family name that has resulted from their rape might well
benefit from psychological treatment, which facilitates their detach-
ment from the social norms that stigmatise rape victims and their fami-
lies. However, our proposal is that it would be crass to believe that this
is all that needs addressing in response to the shame experienced in
such cases. The social norms and the honour groups that embody them
need subjecting to criticism and transformation. The project must be
both psychological and political.
2.2 | Shame: Causal stimuli and response, belief and
expectation or meaning relations?
Shame does not operate in a manner that can be captured through
causal explanation of how a person relates to their world, such as in
terms of stimulus and response mechanisms. Neither is it apt for under-
standing in terms of a person’s beliefs or judgements about their world
and others sharing that world. Shame can simply descend on one; one
can be struck by shame. Shame operates at the level of meaning rela-
tions, where a person takes in their meaningful – their conceptually-
saturated – world. The world understood as the world as we experi-
ence it, as conceptually available to us, is what we mean to invoke in
employing the term lifeworld. Understanding shame, therefore, requires
a way of re-presenting these meaning relations in all their richness, and
not seeking to reduce them to cognitivist (propositional beliefs and
Judgements) or Jamesian (causal) accounts. Hutchinson11 proposed a
framework for making sense of shame expressions, where they might
pose difficulty; this framework was labelled “world-taking cognitivism”,
and while the label is ultimately unimportant, unpacking it serves to
bring out the reasons for proposing the framework.
 The “world-taking” part is there to emphasise that when we seek to
make sense of a particular emotional expression, that with which we
need concern ourselves is the way in which the person expressing
the emotion has taken-in the lifeworld: how they have “read” the
world, or the situation, how they have conceived it. This is a
meaning relation, as opposed to a causal one, such as stimulus and
response.
 The “cognitivism” part is employed in the way that term is used in
analytic meta-ethics (not in cognitive psychology or cognitive sci-
ence) and merely invokes a commitment to the idea that the
thoughts in which we are here interested are responsive to the
world.
So, “world-taking cognitivism” proposes that one makes sense of emo-
tional expressions as based in a person’s takings of loci of significance
in a meaningful world (lifeworld), to which those emotions are answer-
able. Understanding an emotional expression will therefore be arrived
at through reconstructing the (internal) relationship that holds between
a person’s conceptualisation of a situation (including their conceptuali-
sation of self) and the concept of the emotion. Put simply, shame stems
from a person’s perceiving, or “taking” a situation involving them as
characteristically shameful, and their being, who they take themselves
to be, is tainted in and through having taken things in this way.
Shame emerges from meanings encoded in our language at a more
fundamental level than is captured by a focus on propositionally-
structured beliefs, what we might call belief that. What this means is
that shame can often remain untouched by demonstrating to a person
who feels shame that their shame does not find support in rationally-
defensible beliefs about the lifeworld and that person’s role in that life-
world. Shame often rests on framing concepts, that is to say, those
concepts which frame one’s world-view. Treating shame (often)
requires reframing.
This way of understanding shame finds support in recent work on
the placebo response, by authors such as Moerman12 and Benedetti.13
Here also, stimulus-response and belief-expectation explanations are
shown to be inadequate and meaning relations are proposed to explain
the ‘placebo’ response.
3 | SHAME AND HIV
We remarked at the beginning of this article that shame impacts upon
diagnosis and treatment and on public health concerning HIV. In what
follows, we explore this further.
3.1 | Shame’s impact on diagnosis and treatment
Good treatment relies on accurate diagnosis, but it also relies on the
patient following the designated treatment regimen once they’ve been
diagnosed. These are two aspects of the clinical context in which
shame and stigma have an impact.
3.1.1 | The clinical encounter and diagnosis
A significant hindrance to any attempt at diagnosis and therefore, by
extension, good treatment can be located in a patient’s willingness and
11Ibid; Hutchinson, P. (2011). Facing atrocity: Shame and its absence. In
Passions in Context, 1(2).
12Moerman, D. (2002). Meaning, medicine and the placebo effect. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
13Benedetti, F. (2014). Placebo effects (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
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ability to fully and honestly disclose relevant details in response to the
questions of health practitioners. Knowledge is central to diagnosis,
and something acting as an impediment to that knowledge in turn acts
as an impediment to accurate diagnosis and to good treatment. Of
course, the relevance and significance of the role of patient disclosure
can vary across health contexts. Our suggestion is that in the area of
STI diagnosis and treatment, particularly with regards to HIV, the signif-
icance is high. It is important, perhaps crucial, for the health practitioner
to have available to them all the relevant facts, without that availability
being diminished by the patient withholding information. Unfortu-
nately, HIV treatment is also the context in which shame is often oper-
ative as a prominent source of a patient’s resistance and failure to
disclose. This is because of the stigma-effect. Illness and infections
which carry social stigma give rise to shame and that shame can serve
as a hindrance to full disclosure of the relevant facts. We will illustrate
this point with our first case study (CS1).
3.2 | Case study one (CS1 – shame and disclosure)
Susan, a 35 year old woman, attends A&E presenting with worsening
headaches. She is admitted under the neurology team and undergoes
several investigations which are reported as normal. Four days into her
admission, her headaches worsen and she undergoes an MRI scan,
which shows generalised cerebral oedema (brain swelling). Since HIV
can be one of several causes for this, the medical team suggest an HIV
test, and she reveals that she was diagnosed with HIV several years ear-
lier at another hospital. She was being looked after by the HIV service at
that hospital and was doing well on antiretroviral medication. She told
them that she had decided not to tell them this information as she did
not feel it was relevant to her current problem. She also reported that
she had suffered considerable stigmatising behaviour from the non-HIV
specialist health care professionals at the other hospital, which put her
off telling anyone unless it was necessary. She had continued to take
her antiretroviral medication on the ward secretly. With this new infor-
mation, the neurology team contacted the local HIV specialist unit who
arranged for her to be transferred to them the next day. Unfortunately,
before this could happen, Susan collapsed on the ward and died. The
cause of death was thought to be the HIV-related brain disease.
It is reasonable to conclude, that had Susan felt able to disclose
her full medical history to her medical team, they would have been
able to access specialist HIV advice sooner, which might have saved
her life. The shame she experienced following her diagnosis affected
her ability to disclose her HIV status.
3.2.1 | Long term treatment and retention in care
Currently there is no known cure for HIV. Successful treatment of HIV
involves taking antiretroviral medication daily for the rest of an individ-
ual’s life (adherence), and attending HIV services regularly (retention in
care). This is known to be challenging in many chronic diseases such as
diabetes and hypertension, where good adherence is thought to
be>60% of drug doses taken correctly. It is even more challenging in
HIV, where in order to avoid drug resistance >95% of drug doses need
to be taken correctly.
Episodic treatment interruptions cause problems. First, there is
some evidence to suggest that they increase drug resistance, where a
person whose ART regimen is interrupted responds less well to their
ARVs as a result. Second, breaks from treatment increase the chance
of a patient’s health deteriorating, their developing clinical AIDS or
even of their death. The SMART trial, which was a large International
study involving just short of 5500 volunteers in 33 countries compar-
ing continuous with episodic treatment of HIV, was stopped early
when the evidence became clear that the patients who were following
episodic treatment were at twice the risk of developing clinical AIDS.14
Given the nature of stigma associated with HIV, and the shame
that emerges from this, it is reasonable to expect that shame and
stigma might be contributory factors in a person’s decision to stop or
take a break from treatment, and it is this with which we are concerned
here. While, from a narrowly-conceived bio-medical perspective, the
ART might well enable an individual to live a normal life, from a
psycho-social perspective that same therapy – taking the pills, attend-
ing the clinic, the blood tests – might serve to continually remind the
person of their HIV status and the stigma associated with HIV. The
very thing that bio-chemically supresses the virus can serve, psycho-
socially, to trigger stigma and shame. We illustrate this with our second
case study (CS2).
3.3 | Case study 2 (CS2 – shame and non-engagement
in care)
Jamie, a 47-year-old man, was diagnosed with HIV during a routine
sexual health test. He was referred to the HIV service within the same
hospital but did not attend his appointment for assessment. The HIV
clinic contacted him regularly by email to encourage him to come in
and he responded, but said that he did not feel able to come in and he
was dealing with the diagnosis himself. One year later, he developed
bloody diarrhoea, opening his bowels up to ten times a day. He was
admitted to hospital and disclosed his HIV status to the medical team.
Investigations showed that he had advanced HIV infection with a very
low CD4 count and cytomegalovirus colitis, an opportunistic infection
found in very immunosuppressed individuals. He was started on treat-
ment but then developed pneumocystis jirovecii pneumonia requiring
intensive care support. He died 2 months later from the complications
of advanced HIV and several opportunistic infections.
Had Jamie felt able to attend the HIV clinic at diagnosis, he would
have been recommended to commence antiretroviral treatment earlier
and may not have developed life-threatening illnesses due to
immunosuppression.
3.4 | Shame and public health
Combatting HIV does not begin and end with diagnosis and treatment,
it also has a large public health component, which is not reducible to
vaccination. Vaccines simply don’t exist for many STIs, and an HIV
14SMART Study Group. (2006). CD41 count–guided interruption of antire-
troviral treatment. The strategies for management of antiretroviral therapy.
New England Journal of Medicine, 355, 2283–2296.
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effective vaccine is not imminent. Nor is prophylaxis a public health
solution. For example, in the case of HIV, post-exposure prophylaxis
(PEP) is expensive, is associated with quite significant side effects for
some patients, involves strict regimens, and a small time-window
between exposure and effective administration. Pre-exposure prophy-
laxis (PrEP) for HIV is more viable, and we believe should play a part in
the fight against new infections. However, even here there are signifi-
cant problems, in addition to some of those associated with PEP, such
as possibly contributing to drug resistance. However, perhaps the prob-
lem most relevant to our discussion here is the current debate about
PrEP as a sanctioned public health intervention. Here, those who argue
against the use of PrEP often argue against it on the grounds that it
encourages ‘unsafe’, ‘risky’ sexual practices, or sexual practices that
shouldn’t be encouraged from the perspective of specific moral view-
points. Such arguments might serve to stigmatise those who want
PrEP. We will leave this observation here, and focus instead on disclo-
sure and testing.
So, the public health component of the battle with STIs has multi-
ple components, of which two are: disclosure to new sexual partners
and presentation for testing.
3.4.1 | Shame and disclosure to new sexual partners
HIV-stigma can give rise to a sense of shame, and one of the ways in
which individuals might seek to manage this is through withholding
their HIV status. For when one knows others are unaware of one’s
status then their gaze cannot be shaming. Moreover, if shame and
stigma serve to prevent an individual from disclosing their status to
a sexual partner, then it is, perhaps, reasonable to assume that there
might be, for some, a fear of requesting condom use, based on the
same shame and stigma: for if disclosing one’s HIV status is to risk
providing evidence to a potentially ingnorant and prejudiced sexual
partner, then suggesting condom use can be seen as a risk by pro-
viding clues or hints of one’s status to that same prejudiced sexual
partner. While from this perspective withholding one’s status can
seem like a rational response to the fear of shame, it might have
rather catastrophic consequences from the perspective of public
health. For, not only is it likely to contribute to increased infections
but it is also likely to contribute to the problem of late diagnosis,
because a person who has no reason to believe they have been
exposed to infection has little reason to the believe they should be
tested for infection. In the case of infections with prolonged incuba-
tion periods, such as HIV, this is particularly relevant. The decision
to disclose or not is a difficult one. Disclosing to the wrong person
can lead to prejudice, stigma, ostracisation and even intimate partner
violence. We do not propose that combatting HIV-stigma and shame
is desirable because it will enable us to achieve full disclosure. A per-
son’s decision whether to disclose or not can be based on many fac-
tors, we are only conerened that stigma and shame should
combatted as prominent among these factors, where possible. The
desire for privacy should always be respected. It is not clear to us,
for example, that an individual with a fully suppressed viral load has
any moral obligation to disclose their status.
3.4.2 | Shame and testing
The act of attending a clinic for a test can be shaming in itself, in
that the person perceives their attendance at the clinic for testing
serves as a confirmation or admittance that they warrant the suspi-
cion that they might be infected. In this sense the act of attending a
clinic for testing can serve to reinforce an already-existing framing
of STIs and HIV as shameful. The act of attending clinic and pre-
senting oneself for testing can serve to validate or confirm the
underlying framing-concepts. If STIs are stigmatised, then attending
an STI clinic and taking a test for an STI serves to reinforce the
shame that might be felt in response to that stigma. It is difficult to
overstate the problem this presents for public health programmes.
Regular testing is, from a bio-medical perspective, crucial, yet the
very act of testing seems to exacerbate the psycho-social problem
posed by STI- and HIV-shame.
That being said, there is evidence that many people diagnosed
late have been in touch with health care professionals in the recent
past, yet have not been offered tests. It has been shown that bar-
riers to testing are often equally, if not more, likely to be put in
place by the clinician than by the patient. Such barriers might
include poor knowledge about how HIV may present and, among
non-sexual health clinicians, whether a test is needed; it might also
be the case that the health care professional doesn’t know that
there is no longer a requirement for lengthy pre-test counseling. In
addition, reticence in offering an HIV test might: a) emerge from
the healthcare professional’s own embarrassment and shame in
talking about HIV and sexual health, or b) emerge from a fear of
embrassing, shaming or insulting the patient.
Contrast the observations of the previous paragraph with what
we know about settings where HIV testing is routine and “opt-out”
testing rates are high. For example, in antenatal clinics where all
women are offered tests by midwives, the uptake rate is 98%15 (Yin
& contributors, 2014). In order to decrease late diagnosis rates and
encourage HIV testing in non-specialist sexual health/genitourinary
medicine settings, national HIV testing guidelines were written in
2008,16 which aimed to normalize testing. These suggest settings
and clinical situations where testing should be routine, with the
hope that by normalizing the test, more clinicians will offer them.
This might negate the shame felt and transmitted by the clinician in
talking about HIV, which in turn might make it more possible for
the patient to accept the test.
3.5 | Acknowledging the extra-bio-chemical aspects
of HIV pathology
The problem we continue to face might be stated as follows: the bio-
chemical and the psycho-social are fully intertwined in the pathology
15Yin, Z., Brown, A. E., Hughes, G., Nardone, A., Gill, O. N., Delpech V. C., &
contributors. (2014). HIV in the United Kingdom 2014 Report: Data to end
2013. Public Health England. London.
16UK National Guidelines for HIV Testing (2008). Retrieved from http://
www.bhiva.org/documents/guidelines/testing/glineshivtest08.pdf
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of HIV, and to make this claim is uncontroversial. We know that pov-
erty, culturally-bestowed attitudes to sex and sexuality, laws on sex
work, drug use, immigration, and poor mental health, to name but a
few items from a long list, are significant drivers of infection rates,
take-up of testing, and development of clinical AIDS. Believing we can
achieve good clinical treatment and public health policy without taking
full account of the psycho-social aspects of HIV pathology is folly. We
submit that such folly ranks alongside that of someone who assumed
we might achieve good treatment through ignoring bio-chemical treat-
ment of the virus through ARVs while merely focussing attention on
the psycho-social aspects. While the methods of social inquiry and
those of biochemistry differ, and do so in significant ways, what is com-
mon to both is the importance of understanding the nature or charac-
ter of the phenomena;17 a first step in addressing shame and stigma
should be to gain understanding of the nature of shame and stigma in
the context of HIV.
4 | ADDRESSING SHAME IN THE CONTEXT
OF HIV
Shame and stigma operate on individuals at a deep psychological
level, which can make them difficult to overcome. Put another way,
shame can often be experienced by an individual who concurrently
believes that they have nothing about which to feel ashamed. (This
is often depicted as one of the defining characteristics of shame).
So, pointing out to someone that there is no reason to feel ashamed
of their HIV status or their sexual behaviour when responding to
the confidential questions posed by a clinician at a STI clinic, will
often leave untouched the shame which that individual feels. This is
because our emotional reactions are based on the meaning the
social world (lifeworld) has for us and the way that is mediated
through our language. Invariably, the ways such meaning is medi-
ated does not operate at the level of beliefs one has about the
world, but might rather stem from the way certain meanings are
metaphorically encoded in our language, and therefore structure or
frame our beliefs.
It is a characteristic of much shame experience that it is akin to
a feeling of guilt, which occurs accompanied by a clear sense that
one is not guilty of anything. Providing someone who has been
raped and feels shame with a set of reasons for why they are guilty
of nothing will often leave their shame untouched, because the
shame functions at a more fundamental level than does guilt. Shame
is rarely constituted by a set of evaluative beliefs, but is rather
based in the way our language, at a pre-propositional level, frames
our reading of the lifeworld: our conceiving of the world. This
understanding shows us that relieving shame is not about refuting
false beliefs or replacing them with true ones, but a matter of facili-
tating the decoding of the meanings which are conferred, often by
stealth, by the linguistic frames.
One illustration of this point is to look at the ways people
sometimes communicate about aspects of sexual health, such as a
negative HIV test result being communicated as “I’m clean”, thereby
implying that infections are “dirty”.18 While a person might well
believe (and rightly so) that there is nothing “dirty” about having
contracted, or carrying, an infection, the fact that such metaphors
are operative, are encoded in the way we talk about STIs, means
that at a deep psychological level, irrespective of what one might
believe, sexually-transmitted infections are thereby framed in terms
of cleanliness and dirtiness. Here the conceptual metaphor19 of
cleanliness/dirtiness, and the moral connotations these concepts
carry with them, lead to a kind of moral framing of an otherwise
amoral, or morally inert, test result. So, while at the level of
propositionally-structured belief, the recipient of a positive HIV test
might very well, rightly, take the test result in a completely morally
neutral way, at a deeper level, at the level of framing metaphors,
the result is morally-cast. It is as if the metaphor of cleanliness/dirti-
ness serves to colour or taint the meaningful content of the test
result in a way which diminishes the very being of the person who
has had a positive result. The person feels themselves to be viceful,
17Indeed, it is this – the understanding of the differing nature of the phe-
nomena under investigation in each domain of inquiry – that informs us as
to the appropriate methods of inquiry in each domain.
18Some readers might assume we are here invoking Mary Douglas’s work
on dirt and pollution. We are not doing so. It is important to our purposes
here that what we write is not taken as invoking a substantive theoretical
account of dirt and pollution, such as that Douglas advanced. We are simply
employing the example of the clean/dirty metaphor to show how an other-
wise morally neutral social practice/medical procedure can come to have
moral significance at the sub-propositional level – i.e. without an individual
believing that they are worthy of moral sanction – because of the framing
metaphors. We could just as easily have employed a different example
(“free” instead of “clean”, perhaps), which would have invoked another kind
of evaluation, sub-propositionally. What we want to do here is to draw
attention to and give an example of the way in which people can feel
ashamed of something, while concurrently believing that they have nothing
to be ashamed of. They can do so because evaluative “tainting”, so to speak,
can enter via these conceptual (as opposed to literary) metaphors; what are
sometimes referred to as “framing metaphors”. To be sure, if one sought to
unpack the specific ways in which this particular framing metaphor imports
a specific evaluative stance and the way in which this might lead to shame
and stigma, then one would certainly want to consult Douglas’s work at the
outset. But this is not our task here. We are making an argument for why
framing metaphors should be an important locus of investigation when one
seeks to understand shame and stigma. Moreover, that investigation should
begin with an examination of conversation, and the metaphors employed in
those conversations, as opposed to with theories. See Douglas, M. (1966).
[2002]. Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Lon-
don: Routledge.
19Conceptual metaphors are what used to be referred to as ‘dead meta-
phors’; metaphors which are so embedded in our language and ordinary
ways of communicating that we are often unaware of their metaphorical
status. The conception of conceptual metaphor we here employ can be ulti-
mately traced to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was given
programmatic treatment by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and has since
been developed into what is now called cognitive linguistics. We do not
subscribe to the programme of cognitive linguistics, but believe there are
important insights to be found in Lakoff and Johnson’s work on metaphor,
taken alongside Wittgenstein’s work. See Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The philo-
sophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell; Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1989).
Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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while concurrently being clear in their belief that they have commit-
ted no immoral act. Their being is diminished.20
Because shame operates at this level, nullifying it or combating it
requires appropriate methods. One cannot seek to combat shame by
simply presenting to those afflicted by shame an argument that they
have transgressed no rules and therefore their feeling of guilt is unwar-
ranted. To re-employ the “cleanliness” example, the task is to first bring
the person who is ashamed to the realisation that this metaphor of
cleanliness-dirtiness is operative in their subconscious and the moral
framing that it operates to create. The method for combating or nullify-
ing shame is one of identifying the source of the shame, how it is
encoded in one’s way of framing the world. Bringing this encoding to
consciousness will in itself do much to break the grip of shame.
5 | PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE STUDY
What we have set out to do in this article is bring to bear insights from
the latest philosophical work on emotions and shame. Our hope is that
this can lead to the development of strategies which can be imple-
mented, thereby serving to diminish the obstructive role of shame in
the clinical and public health treatment of HIV.
Shame can be addressed at two levels: we can look at the socio-
political drivers of shame, and how these become absorbed into our
ways of speaking. Here a stigmatisation which might begin as a socio-
political attitude, even as a government policy or legal prohibition,
might get fixed in the conceptual methaphors we employ long after
attitudes, policies and laws have changed. Shaming, on this understand-
ing, can be intentional or structural.21 While a shaming attitude might
very well no longer be current, or prevalent, that does not mean that
the shaming effects have passed into history; those shaming effects
might still be present in our modes of expression. So, in addition to
addressing ourselves to current socio-political attitudes, which feed
HIV-stigma, like those documented in Norman Fowler’s recent book
AIDS: Don’t Die of Prejudice,22 we also need to analyse our language
use, including in public health messaging, so that we might ensure that
we are not reinforcing-by-stealth HIV-stigma and shame.23
We propose that studies be undertaken which analyse the concep-
tual metaphors employed in public health literature and the effects
these exercise on individuals. In addition to such a linguistic analysis,
we propose deliberative fora (building on Fulford’s Values-Based Prac-
tice) wherein stakeholders can reflect on their own communication and
value assumptions.24
Whether intentional or structural, these socio-political and linguis-
tic sources of shame serve as sources because of the way they are
taken on, or acknowledged, by individuals. A person’s shame might
have its source in conceptual metaphors employed in talk about them
and their condition (structural) or in pro-active depictions of people
with that condition by others (intentional). In both cases, in addition to
addressing the sources (as proposed in the previous paragraph), a per-
son can be supported and helped in the process of detaching from the
evaluation conferred upon them by the construals, judgements or lin-
guistic acts of others or by the structures. In the UK, psychological sup-
port for people living with HIV is recommended by BHIVA25 and many
clinics have dedicated sexual health psychologists. This is crucial to
good HIV treatment. While HIV remains stigmatised, those living with
the virus deserve psychological support to help them detach from the
stigma, thereby mitigating the shame. Further research on the most
effective way of accomplishing this would be beneficial.
More than merely a virus, HIV serves as a vector through which
flow many of society’s already-present prejudices. Shame often
20We don’t claim that these framing or metaphor effects are determinate.
Some cognitive linguists seem to imply that the effects of framing (concep-
tual) metaphor are determinate (e.g. Kovecses, op. cit. note 8). We propose
that this is an open question, to be answered through further study, and
that it is not something which can be claimed as an acontextual theoretical
truth, as it were. It is for this reason that we resist the depiction of concep-
tual metaphors as “cognitive metaphors”, as one finds them depicted in the
cognitive linguistics literature. We propose that one can gain better under-
standing of the metaphor effects by engaging in conversational analysis of
expressions in which such frames are invoked. What is clear is that such
metaphors carry over from their source domains a set of grammatical con-
straints, which then come to exert control in the target domain. So, the
moves one might make with the concept of “clean” in the context of an
HIV test are to an extent constrained by the grammar of “clean”, as that
grammar is imported from the source domain (where clean is employed
non-metaphorically). However, the effects such conceptual metaphors
might have on individuals beyond these inherited grammatical constraints
will be a matter for investigation, not theory.
21An anonymous reviewer points out to us here the parallels with work on
the social model of disability. We propose to explore the parallels in a
future article. For an overview and retrospective on thirty years of the
social model, by its chief architect, see Oliver, M. (2013). “The social model
of disability: Thirty years on”. Disability & Society, 28, 7.
22Fowler, N. (2014). AIDS: Don’t die of prejudice. London: Biteback
Publishing.
23There is, of course, much literature which discusses metaphor and HIV/
AIDS. See, for example, Crimp, D. (2004). Melancholia and moralism: Essays
on AIDS and queer politics. Cambridge MA: MIT Press; Garcia-Duttman, A.
(1996). At Odds with AIDS: Thinking about a virus. Stanford University Press;
Haver, W. (1997). The body of this death: Hitoricity and sociality in the time
of AIDS. Stanford University Press; Sontag, S. (1989). AIDS and its meta-
phors. London: Penguin; Treichler, P. (1999). How to have theory in an epi-
demic: Cultural chronicles of AIDS. Duke University Press; Watney, S. (1994).
Practices of freedom: Selected writings on HIV/AIDS. Duke University Press;
Yingling, T. (1997). AIDS and the national body. Duke University Press.
This said, as we remark in the notes 19 & 20, we are here concerned not
with specific metaphors, but rather to make a case for the way in which
conceptual metaphors work as frames via which certain constraints (and on
occasions also enabling conditions, via a liberating metaphor) are opera-
tional sub-propositionaly. We are putting forward an argument for why
metaphors matter in understanding shame, the way in which conceptual
metaphors can form part of the conceptual anatomy of shame and stigma.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing us to some of the texts we
cite in this note.
24See Hutchinson, P., & Read, R. (2014). Reframing health care: Philosophy
for medicine and human flourishing. In M. Loughlin (Ed.) Debates in Values-
Based Practice: Arguments for and Against (pp. 69–85). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. Fulford, K. W. M. (2014). Values-based practice:
The facts. In M. Loughlin (Ed.) Debates in values-based practice: Arguments
for and against (pp. 3–20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25British HIV Association Standards of Care for People Living with HIV
2013. Retrieved from http://www.bhiva.org/standards-of-care-2013.aspx/
documents/Standards-of-care/BHIVAStandardsA4.pdf
8 | bs_bs_banner HUTCHINSON AND DHAIRYAWAN
emerges from these prejudiced gazes. One can feel ashamed of
one’s sexuality, one’s sexual behaviour, one’s poor health, one’s
dependency on healthcare, one’s immigration status, one’s low
socio-economic status, one’s failure to heed the warnings in the
public health messages, and on and on. HIV serves to catalyse these
potential sources of shame into what we observe as HIV-shame and
stigma. Understanding the nature of HIV-shame and stigma will
enable us to mitigate its effects.
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